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Abstract  
This paper uses a Finnish policy intervention to study tax competition among 
local governments. Changes in the statutory lower limits to the property tax rates 
are used as a source of exogenous variation to estimate the responses of 
municipalities to tax rates in their neighbouring municipalities. I do not find 
evidence of interdependence in property tax rates among Finnish municipalities. 
The results are in contrast to the earlier empirical literature, using data from other 
countries, that has mainly found positive interdependence in tax rates. I compare 
the causal estimates based on the policy change to the commonly used Spatial 
Lag estimates and Spatial Instrumental Variables estimates, which are based on 
highly restrictive assumptions. The comparisons suggest that the standard spatial 
econometrics methods may have a tendency to overestimate the degree of 
interdependence in tax rates. 
Key words: Property tax, tax competition, fiscal interaction, instrumental 
variables, spatial econometrics 
JEL classification numbers: H20, H71, H77 
 
Tiivistelmä  
Tässä tutkimuksessa hyödynnetään kiinteistöveroja koskevaa reformia kuntien 
välisen verokilpailun tutkimiseen. Tutkimuksessa arvioidaan, miten kunnat 
reagoivat naapurikuntien veroasteiden muutoksiin käyttäen kiinteistöverojen 
alarajojen muutoksia eksogeenisen variaation lähteenä. Kiinteistöverokilpailusta 
ei löydy näyttöä. Tulos eroaa aiemmista muita maita koskevista empiirisistä 
tutkimuksista, joissa on yleensä löydetty positiivinen yhteys naapurikuntien 
veroasteiden välillä. Tutkimuksessa vertaillaan veroreformiin perustuvia 
kausaalisia estimaatteja ja yleisesti käytettyjä spatiaalisen ekonometrian 
menetelmiä hyödyntäviä estimaatteja, jotka perustuvat hyvin rajoittaviin 
oletuksiin. Vertailu viittaa siihen, että tavanomaiset spatiaalisen ekonometrian 
menetelmät antavat ylöspäin harhaisia arvioita kuntien veroasteiden keskinäisestä 
rippuvuudesta.  
Asiasanat: Kiinteistövero, verokilpailu, fiskaalinen vuorovaikutus, 
instrumenttimuuttuja, spatiaalinen ekonometria 
JEL-luokittelu: H20, H71, H77 
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1. Introduction 
The theoretical literature on fiscal interaction among local governments is fairly 
well developed and has identified several potential sources for interdependence 
in taxation and spending decisions. The implications of fiscal interaction for the 
efficiency of public service provision and the allocation of resources across 
jurisdictions have been studied in various settings (see Wilson, 1999, and Wilson 
and Wildasin, 2004, for reviews). By contrast, empirical research on fiscal 
interaction among jurisdictions is still relatively scarce and the identification 
strategies used do not generally meet the standard required for the results to have 
a causal interpretation.  
The estimation of the responses of jurisdictions to taxes and spending in other 
jurisdictions is fraught with endogeneity issues. Firstly, the interdependence of 
taxation and spending decisions among neighbouring jurisdictions leads to two-
way causality, which renders Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of the 
reaction functions inconsistent. Secondly, tax rates in neighbouring 
municipalities may be driven by spatially correlated unobserved factors that lead 
to spurious correlation in tax rates. This paper studies municipal property taxes in 
Finland and utilizes a Finnish policy change as a source of exogenous variation 
in tax rates to overcome these identification problems. The purpose of the paper 
is to estimate the responses of Finnish municipalities to property tax rates in 
neighbouring municipalities. In addition, the causal estimates based on the policy 
change are compared with standard spatial econometrics methods that have been 
commonly used in the literature. 
In Finland, municipalities choose property tax rates within limits set by the 
central government. In the year 2000, the lower limits to the general property tax 
rate and the residential building tax rate were raised. The reform caused imposed 
increases in tax rates that can be used to estimate the effect of tax rates in nearby 
municipalities on the tax rate choices of municipalities. Changes in property tax 
rates are regressed on changes in the average property tax rate of neighbouring 
municipalities by Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) regression. Imposed 
increases in neighbours’ tax rates are used as an instrument for the actual change 
in neighbours’ tax rates.  
Earlier empirical studies fall into two main categories based on how they have 
tried to address the issue of simultaneous determination of policy choices (see 
Brueckner, 2003, for a review). The first group uses the so called Spatial Lag 
(SL) models that estimate reaction functions using non-linear regression and 
maximum likelihood methods.1 The estimation of neighbourhood effects by SL 
                                              
1 For example Allers and Elhorst (2005), Bordignon et al. (2003), Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) and 
Revelli (2001) estimate tax rate reaction functions with the SL model. 
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models hinges on the assumption that the determinants of tax rates, apart from 
neighbours’ tax rates, are exogenous. Moreover, the SL method imposes 
restrictive distributional and functional form assumptions. The second group, 
termed Spatial Instrumental Variables (SIV) models in this paper, estimates the 
reaction functions by Instrumental Variables regression using neighbours’ 
attributes, such as age structure and income, as instruments for their tax rates.2 
Like the SL method, the SIV method also assumes that the jurisdiction attributes 
used as the determinants of tax rates are exogenous. For example endogenous 
sorting of individuals to communities with different combinations of taxes and 
services will bias the standard SIV estimates as well as the SL estimates 
(Brueckner, 2003).  
Gibbons and Overman (2010) analyse identification issues in spatial 
econometrics models and argue that reliable estimation of causal spatial 
interaction parameters requires quasi-experimental settings that provide 
exogenous variation in the variable of interest. This paper is, along with Eugster 
and Parchet (2011)3, the first study using a quasi-experimental design to estimate 
tax competition reaction functions.4  
The empirical results of this study suggest that there is no significant interaction 
in property tax rate choices among Finnish municipalities. While this finding is 
consistent with the theoretical literature discussed in Section 2, it is in contrast 
with the previous empirical literature that has mainly found the dependence of 
tax rates in neighbouring jurisdictions to be positive. Allers and Elhorst (2005) 
provide a table of nearly twenty empirical studies on local tax competition 
including studies using the SL and SIV methods. In their list, the median estimate 
for the response to a percentage point increase in tax rates in neighbouring 
jurisdictions is 0.4 percentage points and most estimates fall between 0.2 and 0.6. 
I compare the estimates based on the policy change to SL and SIV estimates with 
Finnish data. The comparisons suggest that the SL and SIV models may have a 
tendency to give upward biased estimates of the degree of fiscal interaction.  
Section 2 of this paper summarizes theoretical literature on the sources of tax 
competition and discusses the relevance of different theories for the Finnish 
setting. Section 3 provides a description of the Finnish property tax system and 
discusses the reform of 2000 which will be utilized in the empirical analysis. 
Section 4 presents the empirical strategy. Section 5 reports the empirical results. 
Section 6 concludes.  
                                              
2 Papers estimating tax-reaction functions with the Spatial IV model include Besley and Case (1995), 
Buettner (2001), Revelli (2002) and Edmark and Ågren (2008).  
3 Eugster and Parchet (2011) use a regression discontinuity approach to study tax competition in Swiss 
municipalities around the French/German language border. 
4 Dahlberg and Edmark (2008) use a Swedish policy intervention as a source of exogenous variation in 
welfare benefit levels to study “race-to-the-bottom” in welfare benefits. 
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2. Theoretical background 
2.1 Sources of tax competition 
Wilson (1999) surveys theoretical literature on tax competition and divides tax 
competition models into two main categories. As a benchmark category he uses 
Tiebout (1956) type models of public service provision that assume that there are 
many small jurisdictions providing public services funded by non-distorting taxes 
so as to maximize land value in the jurisdiction. Households are mobile and 
choose jurisdictions that provide their preferred bundle of taxes and services. 
Intergovernmental competition benefits consumers by creating a variety of tax-
service bundles for consumers to choose. The sorting of different households into 
different communities leads to an efficient level of public services and improves 
efficiency compared with the situation where taxation and service provision are 
centralized. Accordingly, these models are often referred to as models of efficient 
tax competition. Subsequent work has generalized these models to apply to firms 
(see Richter and Wellisch, 1996). In the efficient tax competition models there is 
no strategic interaction at a localized level since each jurisdiction is small relative 
to the economy. Households or firms are fully mobile and there are no 
externalities or distortions related to local taxation and the provision of local 
public goods. The second category of tax competition models includes models 
that depart from the idealized setting of the Tiebout type models in one way or 
another that may lead to strategic interaction among jurisdictions. Three main 
sources of strategic fiscal interaction identified in the literature are 1) benefit 
spillovers 2) distorting taxes on mobile tax base 3) political economy 
considerations and information asymmetries.  
Benefit spillovers arise if residents of a jurisdiction can benefit from services 
provided by other jurisdictions. Benefit spillovers will lead to negative 
dependence in tax rates since higher spending in a jurisdiction reduces the need 
to spend in other jurisdictions (see Case et al., 1993). The level of services will 
be inefficiently low since municipalities do not take into account the positive 
fiscal externality for others. Benefit spillovers can arise if for instance access to 
parks and other amenities cannot be restricted to the residents of the jurisdiction 
providing the amenity. Negative spending spillovers are naturally possible. For 
example, higher police spending in one jurisdiction may give rise to a negative 
externality if criminals respond by moving their activity to other jurisdictions 
where committing crimes is less risky. 
The second class of tax competition models departs from the efficient tax 
competition setting by assuming that lump sum taxes are not available and 
services are funded by distorting taxes. Typically, these models study capital 
taxes or property taxes that fall at least partly on capital which is mobile across 
jurisdictions. Mobility of capital leads to downward pressure on tax rates since a 
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lower tax rate in one jurisdiction attracts tax base from other jurisdictions and 
forces them to lower their tax rate. Competition for mobile tax base leads to an 
inefficiently low level of public services since jurisdictions have to take into 
account the negative effect of higher taxes on their tax base. In other words, 
higher taxes in one jurisdiction cause a positive fiscal externality for others. In 
the competitive versions of tax competition models there are many relatively 
small jurisdictions that take the net return of capital as given, and hence, strategic 
behaviour is absent (e.g. Zodorow and Mieszkowski, 1986). If jurisdictions are 
sufficiently large to affect the net rate of return, tax rates are set strategically 
taking into account tax rates in other jurisdictions (e.g. Wildasin 1988).  
For the purposes of empirical work on local taxes it is important to note that 
strategic tax competition among jurisdictions in the same region requires that 
capital is not fully mobile but to some extent fixed to the region (Brueckner and 
Saavedra, 2001).5 Another issue with important implications for empirical work 
concerns the heterogeneity of preferences for local public services. With identical 
households, a tax cut in one jurisdiction causes other jurisdictions to bid down 
their tax rates as they compete for the tax base. However, heterogeneous 
preferences and the sorting of high and low demand residents into different 
municipalities may give rise to negative interdependence in tax rates. A tax 
decrease in a low demand jurisdiction may induce high demand jurisdictions to 
increase their tax rates even further in an attempt to retain high service levels. 
Drawing on Brueckner (2000), Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) combine 
heterogeneous preferences and locally fixed tax base and show that in a model 
with two jurisdictions competing for a fixed amount of capital, the relationship 
between capital tax rates in the jurisdictions may be positive or negative (or flat).  
The third type of tax competition takes place if voters use tax rates in their 
jurisdiction relative to other jurisdictions as a yard-stick to evaluate how well 
their government is performing. The underlying assumption is that politicians 
and civil servants are at least partly motivated by self-interest and may use public 
funds for their own benefit. So called yard-stick competition or tax mimicking 
arises if the true costs of providing public services are known only by the local 
government and not observed by voters but tax rates are common knowledge 
(Besley and Case, 1995). In this setting, voters may utilize the fact that the costs 
of providing services in their jurisdiction are likely to be correlated with other 
jurisdictions in the area to assess the performance of their government. Relatively 
high taxes may indicate that the government is inefficient or rent seeking and 
should be voted out of office. As a result, governments are forced to imitate their 
neighbours in order to stay in office. 
                                              
5 Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) argue that some industries are likely tied to specific regions, and that 
part of a region’s capital stock is oriented towards serving the local population (e.g. retail establishments). 
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2.2 Discussion on the relevance for the Finnish setting 
Arguably, benefit spillovers are unlikely to be an important source of fiscal 
interaction in the Finnish setting since the bulk of services provided by the 
municipalities are publicly provided private goods, such as schools, health care, 
nurseries and elderly care. Residents of other municipalities can be easily 
excluded from these services. Some local amenities, such as parks, may generate 
benefit spillovers but the budget share of non-excludable amenities is very small 
compared to excludable services. Competition for tax base and politically 
motivated yardstick competition are more potential sources of spatial 
interdependence in tax rates in Finland.  
The next section discusses the Finnish property tax system and argues that the 
property taxes studied here fall partly on business and housing capital. A higher 
property tax rate lowers the profitability of investment in the municipality and 
may cause capital to locate in other municipalities, which makes competition 
with tax rates in an attempt to attract capital possible. As shown by Brueckner 
and Saavedra (2001), the sign of tax rate interaction due to the tax base 
competition mechanism is ambiguous a priori. 
Yardstick competition may be relevant to the Finnish case since Finnish 
municipalities are governed by elected councils. Information on tax rates is easily 
available, but comparing the efficiency of service provision across municipalities 
is difficult. Municipalities provide a wide range of services and there are no 
commonly used performance rating systems. Hence, voters may use tax rates as a 
benchmark when evaluating the performance of their council relative to other 
councils in the area. 
As the observed patterns of tax rate interaction with Finnish data are likely to be 
a combination of tax base competition (sign ambiguous), yardstick competition 
(positive) and possibly benefit spillovers (positive), the expected relationship 
between tax rates in nearby municipalities is ambiguous. 
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3. Institutional setting and the policy intervention  
3.1 The Finnish property tax system  
Property taxation was introduced in Finland in 1993 to replace a disintegrated 
system of fees and charges on real property. Property taxes are collected by local 
municipalities which are responsible for the provision of the bulk of public 
services, such as elementary schools, basic health care, day care for children and 
elderly care.6 Municipal expenditure is roughly 20 % of GDP and municipalities 
employ almost 20% of the labour force.  
The two main components of the Finnish property tax system are the general 
property tax and the residential building tax.7 The general property tax is applied 
to both residential and commercial land and commercial buildings. The taxable 
value of land is based on the estimated market value of a similar undeveloped 
site, regardless of whether the site is actually developed. Hence, the taxable value 
of land is independent of the development decisions of the land owner and the 
general property tax is a neutral land tax, to the extent that it is applied to land 
(Lyytikäinen, 2009). However, the general property tax is also levied on 
commercial buildings, valued at the estimated construction cost less depreciation. 
The part of the general property tax that falls on buildings makes investment less 
profitable and may cause capital to relocate implying a lower tax base in the long 
run. Hence, municipalities may use the general property tax as a means to attract 
business capital. 
Residential buildings are taxed at a separate tax rate, which is lower than the 
general rate. The assessed value of residential buildings is based on estimated 
construction costs less depreciation, similar to commercial buildings. A higher 
residential building tax rate, other things constant, makes housing investment in 
the municipality less profitable and may lead to a lower tax base over time. 
Therefore, the residential property tax could be used as an instrument in the 
competition for housing capital. 
The local flat rate income tax and grants from central government are the most 
important sources of income for municipalities. Property taxes are relatively 
unimportant in terms of revenue accounting for less than 5 % of local revenues, 
but the fact that property taxes fall partly on capital makes property taxation 
important for competition for capital. Attracting investment to the municipality 
not only increases the property tax base but also affects municipal revenues 
                                              
6 See Moisio, Loikkanen and Oulasvirta (2010) for a more detailed description of the Finnish local public 
finance and service provision system.  
7 In addition, municipalities can apply differential tax rates to un-developed residential lots, non-
permanent dwellings (essentially vacation homes) and power stations. Non-profit organisations may be 
exempt from property taxes. 
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indirectly through the national corporate tax, part of which is redistributed to 
municipalities where the firms are located. In addition, higher business capital 
may benefit the residents of the municipality by improving employment 
possibilities, which in turn boosts municipal income tax revenues. 
The Finnish grant system includes an equalization component which dampens 
the incentives to compete for tax base. The system is based on imputed revenues 
that are calculated applying the average municipal income tax rates and property 
tax rates to the tax base of each municipality. The system then allocates revenues 
from rich municipalities with imputed revenue above an equalization limit 
(roughly 90% of average imputed per capita revenue) to poorer municipalities 
below the equalization limit. Municipalities above the equalization limit give up 
about 60% of their imputed revenue exceeding the limit and this revenue is used 
to raise the imputed revenues of poorer municipalities to the limit. The system 
weakens incentives to attract tax base, but municipalities above the limit still 
benefit from a higher tax base as they can keep 40% of the increase in imputed 
revenues. For a municipality below the limit an increase in the tax base may have 
little direct effect on revenues8, but it may benefit from higher business capital 
indirectly through, for example, better employment opportunities.  
3.2 Property tax limits and the reform of 2000 
Municipalities choose property tax rates within limits which are set by central 
government. The initial allowed range in 1993 for the general property tax rate 
was 0.2 – 0.8% and 0.1 – 0.4% for the residential building tax. In 1999, the upper 
limit for the general property tax rate was raised from 0.8% to 1% and the upper 
limit for the residential building tax rate was raised from 0.4% to 0.5%. This 
reform was relatively unimportant as the upper limit to the general property tax 
was binding for only a handful of municipalities and the upper limit to the 
residential building tax was binding for none of the municipalities.  
In 1999 the government decided to raise the lower limits for the year 2000. The 
lower limit to the general property tax rate rose from 0.2% to 0.5% and the lower 
limit to the residential building tax rose from 0.1% to 0.22%. Graph 1 shows the 
distribution of tax rates in the year 1999 before the reform. The residential 
building tax is on the horizontal axis and the general property tax is on the 
vertical axis. The size of the circle is proportionate to the number of 
municipalities in the cell. The lower limits for both tax rates in the years 1999 
and 2000 are indicated with lines. The new limit to the general property tax was 
binding for approximately 40% of the municipalities and the new lower limit to 
the residential building tax was binding for roughly 30% of the municipalities. 
                                              
8 If the tax rate of the municipality below the equalization limit is above the average tax rate used to 
calculate the imputed revenue, higher tax base increases revenues by the amount exceeding the increase 
in imputed revenue of the municipality. 
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Before the reform, less than 5% of the municipalities applied tax rates 
corresponding to the lower limits. The graph shows that the reform implied large 
forced increases in tax rates for many municipalities. Section 4 describes how 
these imposed tax increases triggered by the reform are utilized to construct an 
instrumental variable for changes in neighbours’ tax rates.  
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4. Empirical strategy 
4.1 Empirical model 
Empirical studies on fiscal interaction are concerned with estimating reaction 
functions that give the value of the decision variable of a jurisdiction as a 
function of spatially weighted decisions of other jurisdictions (see Brueckner, 
2003, for a review). The empirical model estimated in this study is written as 
(1)   
≠
++++=
ij
itititjtijit XTwT ελαγβ . 
The dependent variable Tit is the property tax rate in municipality i in year t. The 
explanatory variable of interest is the weighted average tax rate of other 
municipalities j weighted by spatial weights wij. An often used weighting scheme 
gives neighbours positive weights and zero weights to other municipalities. I use 
the nearest neighbour weight matrix as the base specification but test the 
robustness of the findings to alternative weight matrices discussed in Section 4.5. 
The vector Xit includes time-varying municipality attributes affecting tax rate 
choices, such as age structure and income. The model includes year fixed effects 
αt which capture time variant unobserved factors that are common to all 
municipalities. Municipality fixed effects λi include municipality specific time 
invariant factors.  
OLS estimates of the slope of the reaction function (parameter β) will be biased 
because, with non-zero β, the simultaneous determination of tax rates makes 
neighbours’ tax rates endogenous. I address this endogeneity issue by using the 
policy intervention described in Section 3 as a source of exogenous variation in 
neighbours’ tax rates. A further challenge is spatially correlated omitted variables 
giving rise to spurious spatial correlation in tax rates. I address this issue by 
differencing the data over time to control for time invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity. Before describing the empirical strategy in detail, I briefly discuss 
the standard spatial econometrics methods used in much of the previous 
literature. In Section 5, I compare the policy change based estimates with the 
standard spatial econometrics estimates. 
4.2  Standard spatial econometrics methods 
In previous studies the simultaneity of tax rates has been addressed by estimating 
the so called Spatial Lag (SL) models and Spatial Instrumental Variables (SIV) 
models discussed for example in Anselin (2001).  
The SL model is derived by first writing (1) in matrix form. Assuming that the 
error term is i.i.d. normally distributed with constant variance makes it possible 
to solve the reduced form equation for the vector of tax rates and write the 
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likelihood function. The spatial lag parameter β is then estimated by maximum 
likelihood. The SL models rely on highly restrictive assumptions regarding the 
error distribution and the functional form of the reaction function. Crucially, 
consistent estimation of β requires that the socio-economic attributes used as tax 
rate determinants are exogenous to tax rates (Brueckner, 2003). This assumption 
is unlikely to hold because of omitted variables and because the attributes used 
typically include characteristics like income and age structure that are 
endogenously determined in Tiebout (1956) type models of sorting. Moreover, 
even if the X’s are exogenous, spatially correlated error terms or direct effects of 
neighbours’ X’s on T make the standard SL inconsistent. The latter two issues 
have been addressed by testing alternative specifications or specifying more 
complicated models incorporating the direct effects of neighbours’ exogenous 
attributes and/or spatially correlated errors.9 Identification of β in an expanded 
model containing spatially correlated errors and direct effects of neighbours X’s 
is in principle possible assuming that the specified model corresponds to the true 
data generating process, but it is based on a combination of cross-coefficient 
restrictions and the structure given to the spatial weight matrix (Gibbons and 
Overman, 2010).10 
The main alternative to the SL model is the SIV model which uses the spatial 
lags of socio-economic determinants of tax rates (the X variables in equation (1)) 
as instruments for the spatial lags of tax rates.11 The model can be estimated by 
standard 2SLS. The identifying assumption behind the SIV model is that 
neighbours’ X variables are uncorrelated with the error term. This assumption is 
violated if own X’s are correlated with own error term and the error terms are 
spatially correlated (Gibbons and Overman, 2010). Thus any spatially correlated 
omitted factors that are correlated with the X’s would render the SIV estimates 
inconsistent. It is easy to come up with economic mechanisms giving rise to bias 
in the SIV estimates. In tax competition applications, the instruments typically 
include characteristics like income and age structure that are endogenously 
determined in Tiebout (1956) type models of sorting, and hence, the X’s are 
likely correlated with the error term (Brueckner, 2003). Spatial autocorrelation in 
the error term arises, for example, through sorting on unobservables (e.g. 
unobserved taste for public services) or causal linkages between between 
unobservables (e.g. through mobility between neighbours).  
                                              
9 Brueckner and Saavedra (2001), among others, provide a robust test for spatial autocorrelation in the 
error term. Case et al. (1993) specify a model that incorporates spatial autocorrelation in the error term.   
10 In the peer effects literature it has long been recognized that the correlation of errors within peer groups 
or a direct effect of group’s X’s on individual outcomes makes it impossible to identify the effect of the 
groups’ outcomes on individual outcomes (Manski, 1993). In spatial econometrics models identification 
is in principle possible because typical spatial weight matrices are such that two neighbours do not have 
identical ‘peer groups’ (they weight each other differently). In technical terms, identification is possible 
because spatial weight matrices are typically not idempotent (Gibbons and Overman, 2010).  
11 Higher order spatial lags are sometimes used in addition to the first order lags (e.g. Buettner, 2001). 
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A further problem of the SIV approach is that the predictive power of the 
instrumental variables is often low leading to a weak instrument problem, 
especially in a panel data fixed effects setting, which means that even weak 
correlation between the instruments and the error term may lead to a large bias. 
Accordingly, studies using SIV with panel data and controlling for fixed effects 
are rare.12 
Gibbons and Overman (2010) provide a more formal and extensive analysis of 
the identification issues related to spatial econometrics models including the SIV 
and SL models. They argue that more convincing identification strategies are 
needed to obtain plausible estimates for spatial interaction. In other areas of 
applied empirical economics it has become standard to utilize policy 
interventions, discontinuities in policy rules and other quasi-experimental 
settings that provide a source of exogenous variation in the explanatory variable 
of interest to identify its effect on the outcome variable. This paper is, along with 
Eugster and Parchet (2011), the first to use quasi-experimental data to estimate 
tax competition reaction functions. In order to assess the performance of the 
standard spatial econometrics methods, I will compare the SL and SIV estimates 
with the quasi-experimental estimates. 
4.3 Policy change based IV strategy 
The Finnish property tax reform of 2000 described in Section 3.2 provides an 
opportunity to study the causal relationship between tax rates in Finnish 
municipalities. My empirical strategy is similar to the SIV approach discussed in 
the previous subsection. The crucial difference is that I utilize the policy 
intervention to replace the municipality attributes X, which are unlikely to be 
valid instruments, with an arguably exogenously determined variable affecting 
changes in tax rates.   
I use the panel property of the data and difference the equation (1) to get the 
following estimating equation  
(2)   
≠
−−−
++−+−=−
ij
ittititjtjtijitit uXXTTwTT θγβ )()( 111 . 
Municipality fixed effects cancel out in the differencing. Hence, I control for 
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, which can be arbitrarily correlated with 
neighbours’ tax rates.   
The model (2) is written in a general form, but the empirical analysis exploits tax 
rate changes from 1999 to 2000 generated by the policy change. As described in 
Section 3.2 the reform created imposed increases in the tax rates of many 
                                              
12 Besley and Case (1995) and Revelli (2001) use differenced data to control for jurisdiction fixed effects. 
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municipalities in the year 2000. Actual imposed increases are not observable 
because we do not know which tax rates municipalities would have chosen had 
there not been increases in the lower bounds for the tax rates. I construct a 
measure of predicted imposed increase in the tax rate to derive instruments for 
the spatially weighted neighbourhood tax rate changes in equation (2). I define 
the predicted imposed tax rate increase in municipality i in year 2000 as 
(3)  ))(( 19982000199820002000 iii TTTTDZ −>= . 
In equation (3), T denotes the lower limit to the property tax rate and 
)( 19982000 iTTD >  is a dummy variable that gets the value one if the municipality 
had a tax rate below the lower limit of the year 2000 in the year 1998. I use the 
year 1998 as the base year for defining the predicted imposed increase. Year 
1999 cannot be used as the base year since first differenced models with one year 
lagged dependent variables (or functions of them) are not identifiable. I include 
the own imposed tax rate increase in municipality i in the model as a control 
variable. Similarly as in the SIV approach, I use the spatially lagged predicted 
imposed increase as an instrument for the spatially lagged tax rate change. The 
instrument is written as 
(4)  
≠≠
−>=
ij
jjij
ij
jij TTTTDwZw ))(( 199820001998200002000 . 
A good instrument has to be both relevant (a strong predictor of tax rate changes) 
and valid (orthogonal to the error term). The empirical analysis confirms the 
relevance of the instrument. I argue that the validity condition is very likely to 
hold as well because the instrument is based on a policy change which can be 
considered exogenous to individual municipalities. The identifying assumption is 
that the instrument is uncorrelated with the error term of equation (2). Correlation 
of the instrument with trends or shocks in unobserved factors could violate this 
assumption. In Section 5.3 I evaluate the likely validity of the instrument through 
a placebo treatment type methodology by using tax rate changes in pre-policy 
change years as the dependent variable. The placebo tests suggest that the 
instrument is valid.  
A potential weakness of the first differenced model is that it presumes a 
contemporaneous reaction to neighbours’ tax rate changes. In order to allow for 
more sluggish responses, I estimate models with 2-5 year differences for the 
dependent variable, in addition to model (2).  
4.4 Corner solutions 
The fact that many municipalities are likely to be constrained by the new lower 
limit in 2000 complicates the analysis. The reaction functions of municipalities 
that end up in a corner solution are latent. This may bias the estimation because 
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municipalities for which the new lower bound is a binding constraint appear not 
to respond to tax rate changes in other municipalities even if in an unconstrained 
situation they would respond. Figure 1 illustrates this issue and depicts the 
reaction functions of two municipalities A (horizontal axis) and B (vertical axes). 
The dashed lines represent the lower limits to their tax rates in 1999 and 2000. 
Before the reform in 1999 the equilibrium tax rates are given by the point where 
the straight reaction lines TA(TB) and TB(TA) cross. The reform forces 
municipality A to raise its tax rate to T2000 and municipality B responds by raising 
its tax rate to the value where the vertical line at T2000 crosses its reaction 
function. Municipality A is forced off its reaction function which becomes 
vertical up to the point where TA(TB) > T2000. Hence, the responses of 
municipality A may not be informative of the slope of the unconstrained reaction 
function.  
In order to eliminate the possible bias due to corner solutions I omit 
municipalities that, in 1999, had a tax rate below the new lower limit of the year 
2000. The remaining sub-sample contains municipalities for which the new lower 
bound in the year 2000 was not likely to be a binding constraint. The presence of 
the lower bound may still work against finding a negative response to 
neighbours’ tax rates but positive responses will be detected. Neighbours’ tax 
rates are still calculated using the whole sample. 
4.5 Spatial weights 
The choice of the spatial weight matrix that aggregates tax rates in other 
jurisdictions into a single number is an important part of empirical studies on tax 
competition. Table 1 describes spatial weight matrices used in this study. I use 
the simple nearest neighbour (first order contiguity) matrix Wa as the base 
specification. Matrix Wa gives positive weights to nearest neighbours and zero 
weights to other municipalities. In other words, if municipality i shares a border 
with ni municipalities, all of its neighbours get weights 1/ni and other 
municipalities get zero weights. Because the choice of the weight matrix is 
somewhat arbitrary, I test the robustness of the results to three alternative weight 
matrices. Matrix Wb differs from Wa by weighting nearest neighbours by their 
population in 1998. Both Wa and Wb assume that tax competition is limited to 
nearest neighbours but matrices Wc and Wd allow for a larger spatial scale. Matrix 
Wc gives nearest neighbours weight 1 and neighbour’s neighbours weight 0.5 and 
matrix Wd weights additionally by population in 1998. All the weight matrices 
are row-normalized so that each row sums up to unity and the resulting aggregate 
tax rate is a weighted average. 
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5. Empirical analysis 
5.1 Data and descriptive analysis 
I use panel data on Finnish municipalities from 1993 to 2004. There were 
altogether 444 municipalities in 2004, but the sample size reduces to 411 after 
dropping municipalities with missing data (notably the autonomic area of Åland 
Island) and municipalities that merged with other municipalities over the period. 
In the policy change based 2SLS regressions, I use data from 1999 onwards 
because all the identifying variation in the instrument took place between 1999 
and 2000. The data includes information on property tax rates and socio-
economic attributes such as population, age structure, income and 
unemployment. Also, information on central government grants and on the 
position of the municipality in the tax base equalization system is included. Table 
2 reports summary statistics for variables used in the analysis. In Table 2 
neighbours’ tax rate changes are calculated using a nearest neighbour spatial 
weight matrix (Wa in Table 1). The average general property tax rate in 2000 was 
roughly 0.6% and the average imposed tax increase was 0.07%-points. Thus the 
average proportional increase in the general property tax rate induced by the 
reform was roughly 12%. The residential building tax rates are lower (mean 
0.27%) and the average imposed increase was 0.02%-points. Municipalities are 
highly heterogeneous in terms of population, age structure, unemployment rate, 
disposable income and grants.   
Map 1 shows the property tax rates in 1998. From the maps it is clear that 
property tax rates are spatially correlated. In order to answer the question 
whether this cross-sectional correlation is spurious correlation due to spatial 
autocorrelation in the underlying determinants of tax rates or an outcome of 
localized strategic interaction, I use the empirical strategy outlined in Section 4.  
5.2 Policy change based 2SLS estimates 
Tables 3-5 report the main results of this study. Table 3 contains the 2SLS results 
for the first differenced equation (2) for the general property tax and Table 4 
reports corresponding estimates for the residential building tax. Table 5 reports 
specifications with 2-5 year differences for the dependent variable for both tax 
rates. All the tax rate variables are measured in percentage points. Tables 3-5 use 
the simple nearest neighbour spatial weight matrix Wa. Table A3 in the Appendix 
shows results with alternative spatial weights Wb,Wc and Wd. 
In Table 3, the dependent variable is the change in the general property tax rate 
between 1999 and 2000. The explanatory variable of interest is neighbours’ tax 
rate change between 1999 and 2000, which is instrumented with the predicted 
imposed increase in neighbours’ tax rates. The first stage regressions for Table 3 
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are reported in Table A1 of the appendix. The instrument is positive and highly 
significant with a coefficient of about 0.7-0.8 in all the first stage regressions. 
The Kleinbergen-Paap F statistics indicate that the predicted imposed increase is 
a very strong instrument.  
The first two columns of Table 3 report results with data including all 
municipalities. The first column shows results for a specification that only 
includes the predicted own imposed increase and a dummy variable for a strictly 
positive predicted own imposed increase as controls. The coefficient on 
neighbours’ tax rate change is positive but small and statistically insignificant. 
Taken at face value, the point estimate would imply that a percentage point 
increase in the neighbourhood tax rates would lead to a 0.045%-point increase in 
the tax rate. In the second column, differenced municipality attributes are added 
as control variables. The attributes include grants from central government, 
disposable income per capita, unemployment rate and age structure (shares of 
under 15, 65-74 and over 74 years old). The inclusion of the municipality 
attributes leads to a slightly higher but still small and insignificant coefficient for 
neighbours’ tax rate change.  
Next I address the corner solution problem discussed in Section 4.4 by dropping 
from the sample municipalities that in 1999 had a tax rate below the new lower 
limit of the year 2000. The results from this sub-sample are reported in columns 
3 and 4 of Table 3. Predicted own imposed increase is not included in control 
variables because it is not meaningful for the sub-sample. In column 3, the 
coefficient on neighbours’ tax rate change is -0.089 and insignificant, and 
remains virtually unchanged in column 4 where control variables are added. 
Overall, the results indicate that there is no spatial interaction in general property 
tax rates. 
Table 4 reports the results of the first differenced specifications, analogous to 
Table 3, for the residential building tax. The first stage regressions are reported in 
appendix Table A2. The instrument is positive and highly significant in all 
specifications. The Kleinbergen-Paap F statistics indicate that the predicted 
imposed increase is a strong instrument, albeit somewhat weaker than for the 
general property tax. In Table 4, the coefficient on neighbours’ tax rates varies 
from -0.15 to 0.11 and is statistically insignificant in all specifications. The 
results suggest that there is no interaction in the residential building tax rate 
choices. However, standard errors are larger than for the general property tax, 
and hence, the results are less conclusive than for the general property tax. 
The regressions in Tables 3 and 4 assume that municipalities respond to 
contemporaneous tax rate changes in their neighbour municipalities. It could be 
that actual reactions take place with a lag. In order to allow for lagged reactions, I 
repeat the analysis using longer differences for the dependent variable. Table 5 
shows the results for both the general property tax and the residential building 
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tax. Columns 1-4 use 2-5 year differences respectively. The explanatory variable 
of interest is the same as before (neighbours’ tax rate changes from 1999 to 
2000). The sample used is the unconstrained subsample. The tax interaction 
coefficient is small and insignificant in all specifications for both the general 
property tax and the residential building tax. 
Taken together, Tables 3-5 provide strong evidence against interaction in tax rate 
choices among nearby municipalities in Finland. All the specifications give 
estimates that are close to zero. Moreover, the standard errors are relatively small 
and tax interaction coefficients of the order of 0.4 – 0.5 found in many earlier 
studies can be ruled out for the Finnish data.  
5.3 Placebo tests 
The identifying assumption behind the policy change based IV estimates is that 
the instrument is uncorrelated with the error term of equation (2). The 
assumption does not hold if, due to some unobserved factors, municipalities with 
large imposed increases in neighbours’ tax rates would have changed their tax 
rates differently from other municipalities in the absence of the policy change. 
Suggestive evidence on the likelihood that the identifying assumption holds can 
be obtained by using a placebo treatment type methodology for tax rate changes 
in pre-policy change years. In Table 6, I regress tax rate changes in 1999, 1998 
and 1997 on neighbours’ tax rate change in 2000 (instrumented similarly as 
before). Trends or shocks in unobserved factors correlated with the instrument 
would result in coefficients significantly different from zero. However, the 
coefficients are low and insignificant varying around zero for both the general 
property tax rate and the residential building tax rate showing that the instrument 
is not correlated with unobserved factors driving tax rates before the policy 
change took place. This suggests that the instrument can be considered 
exogenous also in the post-policy change years and increases confidence in the 
main results. 
5.4 Robustness checks 
Table A3 in the appendix analyses the robustness of the results to alternative 
spatial weighting schemes (Wb, Wc and Wd in Table 1). Panels A and B show the 
results for the general tax rate and the residential rate respectively. I allow for 
lagged responses by using one to five year differences for the dependent variable. 
The coefficients on neighbours’ tax rate change are insignificant with all the 
weight matrices in all specifications. 
One potential reason for the apparent lack of interaction in property tax rates 
found in Tables 3-5 is that the equalization component of the grant system 
weakens incentives to compete for tax base. In Section 3 I argue that the 
incentives to attract tax base are higher for municipalities above the so called 
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equalization limit. In order to test for the importance of incentives created by the 
equalization system, I interact neighbours’ tax rate change with a dummy 
variable that gets the value one if the municipality was above the equalization 
limit in 1998.13 I use the 1998 value and not differenced values since changes in 
the position of municipalities in the equalization system are rare. If the 
equalization system has influence on the reaction functions of municipalities, one 
would expect the interaction term to get a positive value. I use the same 
instrument as earlier for the neighbourhood tax rates. The interaction of the 
instrument with the dummy for the equalization status is used as an additional 
instrument for the interaction term. Table A4 reports the results for both taxes for 
specifications with one and two year tax rate differences as the dependent 
variable. Both the main effect of the neighbourhood tax rate change and its 
interaction with the dummy for being above the equalization limit are close to 
zero and insignificant in all specifications. The results indicate that even 
municipalities with higher incentives to compete for tax base choose their general 
property tax rates independently of their neighbours’ tax rates. 
5.5 Comparisons with standard spatial econometrics methods 
Next I apply the SL and SIV methods that have been used in earlier studies and 
compare the results with the policy change based causal estimates reported in 
Tables 3-5. The purpose is not to provide a comprehensive analysis of the 
sources of bias in these methods but rather to check if the easily applicable 
standard SL and SIV methods give estimates that are close to the policy change 
based estimates.   
Table 7 contains the SIV estimates for both the general property tax (columns 1-
2) and the residential building tax (columns 3-4). I use data from 1993-1999 
before the policy change when few municipalities were constrained by the tax 
rate limits. Spatially lagged municipality attributes (shares of under 15, 65-74 
and over 74 years old, grants from the central government, disposable income per 
capita and unemployment rate) are used as instruments for the spatial lag of tax 
rates. The first column reports pooled cross-sectional estimates without 
municipality fixed effects. The coefficient on neighbours’ general property tax 
rate is 0.26 and highly significant. The first stage F indicates that the instruments 
are strong predictors of neighbours’ tax rates but the exogeneity test suggests that 
the instruments can not be excluded from the second stage regression. The cross-
sectional SIV and SL models are the standard methods used in the tax 
competition literature and few earlier studies control for jurisdiction fixed effects. 
Nevertheless, in order to facilitate the comparability with the policy change based 
                                              
13 Edmark and Ågren (2008) find that in Sweden the correlation between neighbour municipalities’ 
income tax rates was weaker after a reform which reduced incentives to compete for tax base. 
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estimates, I add municipality fixed effects in the model in the second column.14 
This reduces the strength of the instruments and the first stage F is indicative of a 
weak instrument problem. The coefficient is roughly 0.5 but only weakly 
significant.  
Turning to the SIV estimates for the residential property tax in columns 3-4, the 
coefficient on neighbours’ tax rate is 0.35 and highly significant in the pooled 
cross-sectional specification. Adding municipality fixed effects increases the 
coefficient to 0.63. Unlike for the general property tax, the instruments are 
reasonably strong also in the fixed effect specification and the estimates are 
relatively precise.  
Table 8 shows the SL estimates for both tax rates.15 Municipality attributes 
included in the model are the same as before. Starting from the general property 
tax, the tax rate interaction coefficient is 0.45 and highly significant in the first 
column reporting the standard cross-sectional SL estimates. Even though 
previous SL tax competition studies do not use jurisdiction fixed effects, the 
second column controls for municipality fixed effects, for the sake of 
comparability, through first differencing and the third column uses 5 year 
differences.16 The estimates are 0.16 and 0.1 respectively. Hence, when fixed 
effects are controlled for through differencing, the SL estimates are similar to the 
policy change based IV for the general property tax. For the residential building 
tax, the SL estimates are positive and highly significant even in the differenced 
specifications. 
Overall the comparison of the widely used SIV and SL estimates with the policy 
change IV estimates cast doubt on the reliability of the SIV and SL methods. 
Especially for the residential building tax, both SIV and SL estimates are in stark 
contrast with the policy change based IV estimates. For the general property tax, 
the SIV estimates are large and positive but become imprecise once fixed effects 
are added to the model. The standard cross-sectional SL method gives large and 
positive coefficients, but when controlling for fixed effects the coefficient 
reduces and becomes insignificant.  
                                              
14 I also estimated first differenced specifications, but the instruments were too weak for the estimates to 
be meaningful. 
15 The SL estimations were carried out with STATA using the spatial data analysis tool package spatreg 
by Maurizio Pisati. 
16 I report results using a cross-section of differenced data instead of time demeaned data or municipality 
dummy variables because within estimation imposes an additional restrictive assumption that 
observations are independently distributed within a municipality. 
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6. Conclusions 
This paper utilizes a Finnish policy intervention to study tax competition between 
local governments. The findings indicate that there is no strategic interaction in 
property tax rates among neighbouring municipalities.  
The empirical findings are consistent with the theoretical literature discussed in 
Section 2. The theoretical prediction for the slope of the tax rate reaction function 
is ambiguous because the reduced form reaction functions estimated in this paper 
are likely affected by potentially opposing forces. The Tiebout/tax competition 
models with mobile residents and heterogenous preferences may yield flat or 
negative reaction functions as well as positive (Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001), 
while yard-stick competition and benefit spillovers give rise to positive 
interdependence.  
Naturally, there are other potential explanations for the lack of localized strategic 
interaction in Finland. Firstly, it may be that the fiscal equalization system 
dampens incentives to compete for tax base. However, I do not find evidence of 
significant tax competition even above the equalization threshold, where 
municipalities benefit significantly if they manage to attract more investment 
within their borders. Secondly, it may be that municipalities compete on business 
and housing capital on a wider geographical level than the neighbourhood level 
used in this study. Localized tax competition among neighbours requires the tax 
base to be, at least to some extent, locally fixed and not freely mobile (Brueckner 
and Saavedra, 2001). Thirdly, it may be that Finnish municipal politicians are not 
largely motivated by self interest and voters trust that tax revenues are not wasted 
on useless bureaucracy. This could explain the lack of `yardstick competition` 
between neighbouring municipality councils. However, it should be noted that 
the policy change used to derive the instrumental variable is not ideal for testing 
for yardstick competition. Tax rate increases imposed by the central government 
may be less relevant for yardstick competition than voluntary tax rate changes. 
Voters may understand that the imposed increase in their neighbour municipality 
is not related to an increase in the costs and demand for services in the area, and 
hence, politicians may be less keen on mimicking imposed tax rate changes than 
voluntary changes. Nevertheless, one would expect that in the long run, when the 
reasons for the imposed tax increases are distant, the yardstick competition 
mechanisms would trigger responses to even imposed tax increases. I do not find 
evidence of significant responses to neighbours’ tax increases even after five 
years.  
While flat tax rate reaction functions are compatible with the theoretical 
literature, the finding of no tax rate interaction is in contrast with most other 
empirical studies that have generally found the tax rates of neighbouring local 
governments to be positively related. Naturally, the absence of interaction may 
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be specific to the Finnish setting where property taxes are a relatively 
unimportant source of revenue. However, the comparison of the estimates based 
on the policy change to the SL and SIV estimates showed that the methods used 
in earlier literature tend to give positive estimates for spatial interdependence in 
tax rates even with Finnish data. In particular, the cross-sectional SL and SIV 
model gave consistently upward biased estimates for the reactions to tax rates in 
other municipalities. The discrepancies between the policy intervention based 
estimates and the SL and SIV estimates suggest that the standard spatial 
econometrics methods may not give reliable estimates of the fiscal interaction 
parameters of interest. More empirical research on different types of fiscal 
interaction using quasi-experimental data for different countries is needed to get 
better estimates of the interaction parameters and to better understand the 
strengths and limitations of the commonly used spatial regression techniques.  
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TABLES 
 
Table 1 
Spatial weight matrices used 
 
  
Nearest 
neighbours 
Neighbours' 
neighbours 
Other 
Municipalities 
Matrix Wa 1 0 0 
Matrix Wb Pop1998 0 0 
Matrix Wc 1 0.5 0 
Matrix Wd Pop1998 0.5*Pop1998 0 
All matrices are normalized so that each row sums up to one. 
 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics (year 2000) 
 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
General property tax rate (%)     
Tax rate 0.593 0.120 0.500 1.000 
Tax rate change 0.069 0.085 -0.100 0.300 
Own imposed tax rate change 0.070 0.094 0.000 0.300 
Neighbours' tax rate change 0.056 0.052 -0.009 0.300 
Neighbours' imposed tax rate change 0.060 0.057 0.000 0.300 
Residential building tax rate (%)     
Tax rate 0.265 0.048 0.220 0.400 
Tax rate change 0.030 0.040 -0.100 0.200 
Own imposed tax rate change 0.021 0.030 0.000 0.120 
Neighbours' tax rate change 0.027 0.024 -0.021 0.174 
Neighbours' imposed tax rate change 0.024 0.023 0.000 0.120 
Municipality attributes     
Population (1000's) 12.51 35.05 0.24 555.47 
Grants/capita (1000's) 1.34 0.48 0.10 3.09 
Disposable income/capita (1000's) 11.24 2.42 7.13 31.65 
Unemployment rate 0.133 0.046 0.037 0.284 
Age 0-15 0.198 0.032 0.110 0.341 
Age 61-74 0.146 0.029 0.059 0.239 
Age 75- 0.082 0.024 0.019 0.144 
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Table 3 
 General property tax: policy change based 2SLS estimates for first differenced 
specification 
 
Dep. var: Tax rate change (Δ2000-1999) All municipalities 
Unconstrained  
sub-sample 
Neighbours' tax rate change (Δ2000-1999) 0.045 0.069 -0.089 -0.103 
 [0.077] [0.078] [0.087] [0.092]    
Own imposed increase 0.825*** 0.828***                  
 [0.062] [0.059]                  
Non-zero own imposed increase (1/0) -0.018* -0.019*                  
 [0.010] [0.010]                  
Per capita grants  (Δ1999-1998)  -0.003  0.011 
  [0.042]  [0.053]    
Per capita income  (Δ1999-1998)  0.000  -0.001 
  [0.003]  [0.003]    
Unemployment rate (Δ1999-1998)  -0.274  0.29 
  [0.329]  [0.363]    
Age 0-15  (Δ1999-1998)  0.616  -0.031 
  [0.574]  [0.736]    
Age 61-75  (Δ1999-1998)  0.495  0.291 
  [0.793]  [0.847]    
Age 75-  (Δ1999-1998)  0.738  2.004 
  [1.271]  [1.638]    
Kleibergen-Paap F 237.6 241.8 83.1 90.9 
R-squared 0.611 0.614 0.001 0.003 
Observations 411 411 258 258 
Neighbours’ expected imposed increase used as an instrument for neighbours’ tax rate change. 
Robust standard errors in brackets.  
Significance levels are denoted by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Spatial weights: nearest neighbours with equal weights (Wa). 
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Table 4 
 Residential building tax: policy change based 2SLS estimates for first 
differenced specification 
 
Dep. var: Tax rate change (Δ2000-1999) All municipalities 
Unconstrained  
sub-sample 
Neighbours' tax rate change (Δ2000-1999) 0.060 0.106 -0.146 -0.057 
 [0.191] [0.191] [0.159] [0.161] 
Own imposed increase 0.642*** 0.638***   
 [0.093] [0.091]   
Non-zero own imposed increase (1/0) 0.003 0.003   
 [0.004] [0.004]   
Per capita grants (Δ1999-1998)  -0.051*  -0.015 
  [0.029]  [0.039] 
Per capita income (Δ1999-1998)  -0.005***  -0.004* 
  [0.002]  [0.002] 
Unemployment rate (Δ1999-1998)  0.229  0.227 
  [0.162]  [0.234] 
Age 0-15  (Δ1999-1998)  0.093  -0.132 
  [0.388]  [0.543] 
Age 61-75  (Δ1999-1998)  0.381  0.503 
  [0.444]  [0.626] 
Age 75-  (Δ1999-1998)  1.155  1.327 
  [0.915]  [0.976] 
Kleibergen-Paap F 97.9 87.1 27.3 24.1 
R-squared 0.308 0.333 0.001 0.029 
Observations 411 411 218 218 
Neighbours’ expected imposed increase used as an instrument for neighbours’ tax rate change. 
Robust standard errors in brackets.  
Significance levels are denoted by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Spatial weights: nearest neighbours with equal weights (Wa).
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Table 5 
Policy change based 2SLS estimates for 2–5 year differences of the dependent 
variable 
 
Panel A: General property tax         
Dep. var: Long term tax rate change Δ2001-1999 Δ2002-1999 Δ2003-1999 Δ2004-1999 
Neighbours' tax rate change (Δ2000-1999) -0.079 0.061 0.133 0.135 
 [0.100] [0.150] [0.178] [0.176]    
Municipality attributes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap F 90.9 90.9 90.9 90.9 
R-squared 0.015 0.043 0.045 0.029 
Observations 258 258 258 258 
Panel B: Residential building tax         
Dep. var: Long term tax rate change Δ2001-1999 Δ2002-1999 Δ2003-1999 Δ2004-1999 
Neighbours' tax rate change (Δ2000-1999) 0.003 0.114 -0.027 -0.161 
 [0.172] [0.234] [0.251] [0.255]    
Municipality attributes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap F 24.1 24.1 24.1 24.1 
R-squared 0.026 0.053 0.063 0.07 
Observations 218 218 218 218 
Neighbours’ expected imposed increase used as an instrument for neighbours’ tax rate change. 
Robust standard errors in brackets.  
Significance levels are denoted by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Spatial weights: nearest neighbours with equal weights (Wa).
 
 
Table 6 
Placebo effects in pre-treatment years 
 
  
General property 
tax   Residential building tax 
Dep. var: Past tax rate change Δ1999-1998 Δ1998-1997 
Δ1997-
1996 
Δ1999-
1998 
Δ1998-
1997 
Δ1997-
1996 
Neighbours' tax rate change (Δ2000-
1999) -0.13 0.042 0.102 -0.032 0.068 -0.046 
 [0.163] [0.117] [0.078] [0.297] [0.178] [0.087] 
Municipality attributes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap F 75.9 84.6 85.7 22.7 26.9 23.8 
R-squared 0.018 0.049 0.021 0.022 0.016 0.023 
Observations 258 258 258 218 218 218 
Neighbours’ expected imposed increase used as an instrument for neighbours’ tax rate change. 
Robust standard errors in brackets.  
Significance levels are denoted by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Spatial weights: nearest neighbours with equal weights (Wa). 
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Table 7 
Spatial IV estimates 
 
Dep. Var: Tax rate General property tax  Residential building tax 
Neighbours' tax rate (t) 0.257*** 0.555* 0.354*** 0.632*** 
 [0.093] [0.309] [0.123] [0.168] 
Per capita grants  (t-1) 0.012 -0.038** 0.005 -0.003 
 [0.015] [0.019] [0.005] [0.011] 
Per capita income  (t-1) 0.024*** -0.014*** -0.002** -0.007*** 
 [0.006] [0.005] [0.001] [0.002] 
Unemployment rate (t-1) 0.578*** 0.136 0.067** 0.031 
 [0.095] [0.083] [0.030] [0.048] 
Age 0-15  (t-1) -0.973*** -0.727** 0.137** 0.121 
 [0.231] [0.287] [0.061] [0.163] 
Age 61-75  (t-1) -0.969*** 0.118 0.146** 0.187 
 [0.233] [0.283] [0.072] [0.174] 
Age 75-  (t-1) 0.397 -0.669* 0.191* 0.539* 
 [0.287] [0.390] [0.101] [0.315] 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality fixed effects  Yes  Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap F 59.5 8.0 24.0 13.0 
Hansen's J (p-value) 0.000 0.559 0.000 0.777 
R-squared 0.278 0.118 0.183 0.14 
Observations 2466 2466 2466 2466 
Sample period 1993 - 1999. 
Spatial IV uses neighbours’ characteristics as instruments for neighbours’ tax rate change. 
Standard errors clustered at municipality level in brackets.  
Significance levels are denoted by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Spatial weights: nearest neighbours with equal weights (Wa). 
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Table 8 
Maximum Likelihood Spatial Lag estimates 
 
  General property tax   Residential building tax 
Dep. Var: Tax rate level 1999 Δ1999-1998 Δ1999-1994 level 1999 Δ1999-1998 Δ1999-1994 
Neighbours' tax rate 0.449*** 0.160** 0.104 0.361*** 0.201*** 0.312*** 
 [0.054] [0.072] [0.076]    [0.059] [0.069] [0.060]    
Per capita grants 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]    [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]    
Per capita income 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000*   
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]    [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]    
Unemployment rate 0.007*** 0.007* 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 [0.002] [0.004] [0.002]    [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]    
Age 0-15 -0.019*** -0.013 -0.010*   0.000 -0.003 0.003 
 [0.004] [0.010] [0.005]    [0.002] [0.005] [0.003]    
Age 61-75 -0.015*** -0.013 0.003 0.001 -0.006 0.005*   
 [0.005] [0.011] [0.005]    [0.002] [0.006] [0.003]    
Age 75- -0.008 -0.011 -0.017** 0.000 0.007 0.005 
 [0.006] [0.015] [0.008]    [0.003] [0.008] [0.004]    
Log-likelihood 240.1 502.3 359.9 596.9 786.9 639.2 
Observations 411 411 411 411 411 411 
Covariates differenced similarly as the dependent variable.  
Standard errors in brackets. 
Significance levels are denoted by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Spatial weights: nearest neighbours with equal weights (Wa).
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GRAPHS, FIGURES AND MAPS 
 
Graph 1  
Property tax rates in 1999 and the reform of 2000 
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Figure 1  
Reaction functions and tax rate limits  
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Map 1  
Property tax rates in 1998 
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APPENDIX TABLES 
 
Table A1  
First stage regressions for the general property tax (cf. Table 3) 
 
Dep var: Neighbours' tax rate change (Δ2000-1999) All municipalities 
Unconstrained  
sub-sample 
Neighbours' imposed increase 0.744*** 0.755*** 0.683*** 0.693*** 
 [0.048] [0.049] [0.075] [0.073]    
Own imposed increase 0.010 0.010                  
 [0.029] [0.029]                  
Non-zero own imposed increase (1/0) 0.000 0.001                  
 [0.005] [0.005]                  
Per capita grants (Δ1999-1998)  -0.028  -0.054*   
  [0.021]  [0.030]    
Per capita income (Δ1999-1998)  0.006**  0.007*** 
  [0.003]  [0.003]    
Unemployment rate (Δ1999-1998)  -0.042  0.100 
  [0.163]  [0.224]    
Age 0-15  (Δ1999-1998)  -0.089  -0.004 
  [0.468]  [0.664]    
Age 61-75  (Δ1999-1998)  0.149  0.456 
  [0.511]  [0.733]    
Age 75-  (Δ1999-1998)  -0.014  0.905 
  [0.716]  [1.004]    
Kleibergen-Paap F 237.6 241.8 83.1 90.9 
R-squared 0.647 0.657 0.492 0.517 
Observations 411 411 258 258 
Robust standard errors in brackets.  
Significance levels are denoted by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Spatial weights: nearest neighbours with equal weights (Wa). 
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Table A2  
First stage regressions for the residential building tax (cf. Table 4) 
 
Dep var: Neighbours' tax rate change (Δ2000-1999) All municipalities 
Unconstrained  
sub-sample 
Neighbours' imposed increase 0.665*** 0.677*** 0.631*** 0.621*** 
 [0.067] [0.073] [0.121] [0.127]    
Own imposed increase 0.008 0.013                  
 [0.045] [0.045]                  
Non-zero own imposed increase (1/0) -0.001 -0.001                  
 [0.002] [0.002]                  
Per capita grants (Δ1999-1998)  -0.017  -0.019 
  [0.012]  [0.015]    
Per capita income (Δ1999-1998)  0.002*  0.002 
  [0.001]  [0.001]    
Unemployment rate (Δ1999-1998)  0.027  0.035 
  [0.082]  [0.104]    
Age 0-15  (Δ1999-1998)  -0.052  0.148 
  [0.250]  [0.339]    
Age 61-75  (Δ1999-1998)  0.231  -0.164 
  [0.236]  [0.269]    
Age 75-  (Δ1999-1998)  0.344  -0.148 
  [0.411]  [0.398]    
Kleibergen-Paap F 97.9 87.1 27.3 24.1 
R-squared 0.429 0.437 0.338 0.349 
Observations 411 411 218 218 
Robust standard errors in brackets.  
Significance levels are denoted by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Spatial weights: nearest neighbours with equal weights (Wa). 
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Table A3 
Policy change based 2SLS estimates with alternative spatial weights  
 
Panel A: General property tax           
Dep. var: Tax rate change Δ2000-1999 Δ2001-1999 Δ2002-1999 Δ2003-1999 Δ2004-1999 
Spatial weights: Wb      
Neighbours' tax rate change (Δ2000-1999) -0.061 -0.02 0.172 0.243 0.149 
 [0.088] [0.098] [0.152] [0.184] [0.178]    
Spatial weights: Wc      
Neighbours' tax rate change (Δ2000-1999) 0.012 0.138 0.304 0.279 0.165 
 [0.149] [0.165] [0.285] [0.317] [0.296]    
Spatial weights: Wd      
Neighbours' tax rate change (Δ2000-1999) -0.107 -0.07 0.111 0.097 0.098 
 [0.120] [0.132] [0.241] [0.266] [0.250]    
Panel B: Residential building tax           
Dep. var: Tax rate change Δ2000-1999 Δ2001-1999 Δ2002-1999 Δ2003-1999 Δ2004-1999 
Spatial weights: Wb           
Neighbours' tax rate change (Δ2000-1999) -0.056 0.002 0.137 0.094 0.006 
 [0.130] [0.151] [0.197] [0.208] [0.211]    
Spatial weights: Wc      
Neighbours' tax rate change (Δ2000-1999) 0.209 0.169 0.084 -0.056 -0.193 
 [0.161] [0.174] [0.204] [0.253] [0.218]    
Spatial weights: Wd      
Neighbours' tax rate change (Δ2000-1999) 0.159 0.154 0.178 -0.015 -0.222 
  [0.158] [0.168] [0.235] [0.269] [0.253]    
All specifications include the same municipality attributes as control variables as Table 5. 
Neighbours’ expected imposed increase used as an instrument for neighbours’ tax rate change. 
Robust standard errors in brackets.  
Significance levels are denoted by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Spatial weights: See Table 1. 
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Table A4 
Interaction with the position in the equalization system 
 
  General property tax Residential building tax 
Dep. var: Tax rate change Δ2000-1999 Δ2001-1999 Δ2000-1999 Δ2001-1999 
Neighbours' tax rate change (Δ2000-1999) -0.117 -0.074 -0.039 0.034 
 [0.097] [0.109] [0.182] [0.196] 
Neighbours' tax rate change (Δ2000-1999) 0.046 -0.018 -0.066 -0.112 
*Dummy(Above equalization limit) [0.106] [0.116] [0.122] [0.142] 
Municipality attributes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap F 41.6 41.6 9.9 9.9 
R-squared 0.008 0.014 0.031 0.03 
Observations 258 258 218 218 
Neighbours’ expected imposed increase used as an instrument for neighbours’ tax rate change. 
Robust standard errors in brackets.  
Significance levels are denoted by * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Spatial weights: nearest neighbours with equal weights (Wa). 
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